essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons," a philosophical and ecological sophistication of the anthropocentric position, also appeared in these anthologies. ' For their part, Christian theologians and scientists either denounced White's thesis or reexamined their own religious beliefs and values. Conferences were organized and received wide press coverage. White claimed with some justification to have created "the theology of ecology." As a consequence, many theologians now advocate a less exploitive attitude toward naturereferred to as "stewardship"-that has much in common with the orthodox position of conservationists. Few, if any, were willing to follow White in advocating St. Francis and ecological equality. 8 Thus, what had begun as another wave of the conservation movement had turned by the late 1960s into a radical critique of the basic assumptions of modern Western society. Carroll Pursell called this a move "from conservation to ecology."9 Much of this radical critique, however, was developed by professional biologists and ecologists relying on their scientific training and experiences, in addition to the literature of social critics such as Huxley and Orwell, and the Zen Buddhist vision of harmony with nature.
Even before White published his provocative essay, Marston Bates had chided professional philosophers for "dallying in their academic groves" when the need for a new ecologically-based philosophy was imperative. He pointed to the unnatural Christian separation of humans from nature and proposed St. Francis as the patron saint of ecologists. Through this period the widely read anthropologist Loren Eiseley also was focusing attention upon the narrow anthropocentrism and environmental destructiveness of modern man. '0 Raymond Dasmann, who wrote influential books from a broad social perspective, was advocating a move to the "future primitive" and "ecosystem people" ways of life by the 1970s. According to John Milton, a self-professed Zen Buddhist, Zen taught that "there is really no distinction between the organism and its environment. " And Frank Egler proposed a new world view called Human Ecosystem Science: "I look to Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism . . . as the womb from which a humanitarian-oriented Human Ecosystem Science may yet arise. " " I Paul Shepard's essay, "Ecology and Man," was another landmark in the critique of Western anthropocentrism. Influenced by the Zen Buddhist views of Alan Watts, Shepard discussed the different metaphysics resulting from an ecological perception. He characterized ecology as the subversive science or subject: "the ideological status of ecology is that of a resistance movement. Its Rachel Carsons and Aldo Leopolds are subversive." Since the publication of his first book in 1967, Shepard has been one of the most provocative thinkers in the development of the emerging ecological world view. 12 Ecologists have continued to provide philosophical direction for this revolution in thinking. The Canadian, John Livingston, combined ecological insight with a critique of Western anthropocentrism. He argued against the treatment of plants and animals primarily as human resources. Livingston's colleague, Neil Everndon, pointed out that the idea of interrelatedness goes beyond the usual scientific sense of causal connectedness; from an ecological standpoint there are no discrete entities. Recently Everndon has critiqued anthropocentric "resourcism" and developed a phenomenological approach to philosophical ecology. ' 3 In The Arrogance of Humanism David Ehrenfeld leaned heavily on the writings of George Orwell in developing his powerful critique of anthropocentric humanism and the failure of modern technology. He argued that the exclusive emphasis upon reason has divorced us from the crucial survival functions of instinct, emotion, and intuition. Ehrenfeld discussed the failure of viewing the world in terms of resources and referred approvingly to Charles Elton's ecocentric and religious reasons for protecting ecological diversity.
Anne and Paul Ehrlich argued in 1981 for the ecological necessity of vast expanses of unmanaged wilderness as species habitat. Nonhuman species, they claimed, have intrinsic value and the right to exist which is "the first and foremost argument for the preservation of all nonhuman species." More recently, Paul Ehrlich has claimed that "the main hope for changing humanity's present course may lie . . . in the development of a world view drawn partly from ecological principles-in the so-called deep ecology movement. " '4 The emergence of the Age of Ecology was, of course, heavily indebted to earlier writers. St. Francis was unique for attempting to divert mainstream Christianity back to a position of ecological equality. During the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century, Spinoza had attempted to undercut the materialistic scientism of Hobbes and the mind-body dualism and domination of nature themes of Descartes and to establish instead a holistic nonanthropocentric pantheism. His system influenced Goethe and other writers of the European Romantic movement, now understood as a natureoriented, countercultural force aligned against the rise of the narrowly scientific industrial society. That countercultural force took shape in America in the Transcendentalism of Whitman, Emerson, and Thoreau. In the late nineteenth century, John Muir moved away from the subjectivism of Romanticism and Transcendentalism and arrived at the major generalizations of ecology through direct experience of ecological interrelatedness.
There were also forewarnings by George Perkins Marsh and John Stuart Mill. The latter could see no ultimate value in conquering nature and called for a "stationary state" in population and economics. At the beginning of the twentieth century, George Santayana attacked the anthropocentrism of the dominant Western philosophy and religion and called for a new "noble moral imagination" that would extend the democratic principle "to the animals, to inanimate nature, to the cosmos as a whole." In effect, Muir and Santayana at the beginning of the twentieth century were challenging America to develop an ecocentric philosophy and a new ecological way of life. '5 After A great deal of credit for developing the new ecological world view must go to the professional ecologists of the last twenty years. And behind their efforts stood the towering figure of Aldo Leopold. But we must also look to the literary critics and naturalists-from Thoreau and Muir to Jeffers, Huxley, Orwell, and Snyder-who prepared the soil for the Age of Ecology and gave it a wider and deeper perspective. '
The philosopher Wallace Matson has remarked that "great philosophy is reflection after the fact; it is the effort of thoughtful men to make sense of the world once again after the old picture has become no longer believable. Arne Naess argued that "the emergence of ecologists from their former relative obscurity marks a turning point in our scientific communities. But their message is twisted and misused." The shallow movement is a shortterm, pragmatic reform approach, in his view, concerned mainly with the symptoms of environmental disease such as pollution and resource depletion. Its objective, Naess claimed, was anthropocentric and parochial-"the health and affluence of people in the developed countries." The long-range "deep" movement was proposing a major realignment in our thinking about humans and nature consistent with an ecological perspective. Naess claimed that the experiences of ecologists and others associated with wild nature gave rise during the 1960s to scientific conclusions and intuitions that were amazingly similar. These included the awareness of the internal interrelatedness of ecosystems; ecological egalitarianism (all species have an equal right to live and blossom); the principles of diversity and symbiosis; an anti social-class position; the appreciation of ecological complexity leading to the awareness of the "human ignorance of biospherical relationships." The ecological field worker "acquires a deep-seated respect, or even veneration, for ways and forms of life," the principles of local autonomy and decentralization.
Naess also claimed that "insofar as ecology movements deserve attention they are ecophilosophical rather than ecological:" Leopold also claimed that "the conqueror role is eventually self-defeating. ... the biotic mechanism is so complex that its workings may never be fully understood." That humility in the face of the ultimate mystery of the universe and natural processes can also be found in the writings of Loren Eiseley, in Rachel Carson's criticism of the "control of nature," and in Frank Egler's view that "nature is not only more complex than we think, but it is more complex than we can think." This emphasis by modern ecologists strikes at the heart of the Western domination assumption, challenges the main tenets of modern science, and provides the key to the "subversives' nature of ecology. Ecologists William Murdoch and Joseph Connell pointed out: "We submit that ecology as such probably cannot do what many people expect it to do; it cannot provide a set of 'rules' of the kind needed to manage the environment."34 According to Aldo Leopold, man was "only a member of the biotic team." An ecological view, "the combined evidence of history and ecology," leads to the conclusion that "the less violent the man-made changes, the greater the probability of successful readjustment" of the ecological pyramid. The ecological revolution has challenged modern Western ethics even in its adequacy for human-to-human relations. Stuart Hampshire and Alisdair Maclntyre argue that the system belittles and diminishes the dignity and potential of humans, because it lacks a conception of human telos or ideal of character. That line of criticism contends that the concept of "rights" is a fiction. According to Maclntyre, morality must be grounded in practices designed to promote a human telos, using Aristotle's ethics as an example. Hampshire has compared the telos (or self-realization) theories of Aristotle and Spinoza and finds the latter to be superior. Arne Naess also believes Spinoza's ideal to be fruitful and has described what he calls the "ecological self"-a self that identifies not only with other humans, but also with non-human species and ecosystems. Michael Zimmerman also argues that Aristotle's conception of human telos is too anthropocentric. Martin Heidegger, he points out, developed a model of human telos that is more ecocentric. Heidegger would agree with Maclntyre that moral behavior must be rooted in a profound understanding of what it means to be human; ontology precedes ethics. For Heidegger, the telos of humankind involves learning to treat beings other than merely as objects for our purposes, or letting beings reveal themselves in ways appropriate to their own possibilities.4' Misunderstanding of deep ecology has resulted from assuming that its goal is to produce an ecological ethic in the sense of modern Western ethics. Genevive Lloyd examined Spinoza's philosophy from an ecological standpoint and concluded that the ethics of the system were anthropocentric. But Naess argued that Spinoza does not have an ethical system in the modern sense. He suggested that Spinoza was an opponent of moralism. He asked: "Do we need to shift to moralizing in order to find a satisfactory metaphysics of environmentalism?" For their part, deep ecologists still use ethical vocabulary such as "rights" and "obligations" without subscribing to the modern technical philosophical theories attached to those words. Naess describes ecological egalitarianism as an intuition experienced by those in the deep ecology movement, not an ethical theory to be defended by rational argument. 42 It is significant that the Age of Ecology stems from the efforts of one woman, Rachel Carson, even though its groundwork can be traced to others. Carson combined scientific training in biology with emotional sensitivity to the ecological world, and she led the way in political activism.
The term ecofeminism was coined by the French writer Fransoise d'Eaubonne in 1974. A few years later Theodore Roszak referred to the rise of ecofeminism as a "return of the Goddess." And Fritjof Capra has pointed to the patriarchal dominance over both women and nature in Western culture since Biblical times. The masculine emphasis upon scientific method and rational analytical thinking, he claimed, "has led to attitudes that are profoundly antiecological." Rational thinking is linear, whereas "ecological awareness arises from an intuition of nonlinear thinking." The environmental crisis, therefore, is a result of overemphasizing our masculine side and neglecting the feminine (intuitive wisdom, synthesis, ecological awareness, nurturing, and caring). The metaphysical revolution in physics, according to J. Baird Callicott, involves a change in our understanding of ethics. Modern Western ethics assumes the classical idea of discrete atomistic individuals. And the positivist fact-value distinction, also typical of modern Western ethics, is based upon the subject-object distinction. The new physics undermines both those views: "Quantum theory negates the subject-object, fact-value dichotomies to which modern value theory has dutifully conformed." Callicott concludes that "the central problem of modern classical moral philosophy-the problem of either managing or overcoming egoism-is not solved by the moral psychology implicated in ecology so much as outflanked."50 But Arne Naess argues that modern theoretical science has become so abstract that it cannot be understood as describing reality. He promotes gestalt perception as an adequate foundation for deep ecology. Experience in terms of gestalts also eliminates subject/object, fact/value dichotomies. Naess distinguishes between the world of gestalts that humans live in and the abstract conceptual theories of modern science. From this perspective, environmentalists and developers differ largely in terms of opposing gestalts.5 1 While Capra, Fox, and Callicott turn to the holistic metaphysics of the new physics as a basis for an ecological world view, McLaughlin and Naess turn away from abstract science to the experiences of the everyday world in the nonconceptual Zen Buddhist image, or in gestalt perception. Morris Berman sides with the latter. The holistic cybernetic thinkers of the 1980s are becoming too abstract, he claims, and have not fully overcome the "mechanical philosophy." Cybernetic holism dispenses with matter, according to Berman, and "falls prey to the same philosophical problems that plague modern science." It is "abstract and formal, capable of being bent to any reality," and appears to be "value-free." Cybernetic holism projects, Berman believes, "a total vision of reality that circumscribes an entire world." Berman distinguishes between two types of holism, "the one, a sensuous, situational, living approach to process," and the other, an abstract form characteristic of many philosophical spokesmen for "the New Age." The latter, now in a more appealing form, is the last phase of classical science. "The real issue," according to Berman, is not mechanism versus holism, but "whether the philosophical system is embodied or disembodied. 
